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Articles
Cross-jurisdictional and other implications
of mandatory clothing retailer obligations
Michael Rawling*
This article is about the imposition of mandatory obligations upon effective
business controllers of supply chains for the protection of workers.
Specifically, the article analyses the genesis, design and operation of New
South Wales, South Australian and Queensland mandatory clothing retailer
codes and their broader implications, including for the cross-jurisdictional
regulation of international supply chains. The extent to which those state
mandatory codes already operate cross-jurisdictionally to regulate supply
chains spanning across jurisdictions throughout Australia is analysed. It is
argued that imposing mandatory obligations upon effective business
controllers of supply chains is necessary to adequately address the
exploitation of domestic and overseas supply chain labour. In an analogous
fashion to the operation of the mandatory clothing retailer codes, domestic
legislative regulation of international supply chains can be achieved by
piggybacking mandatory requirements onto the intrinsically
cross-jurisdictional agreement between an effective business controller and
its outside supplier.
Introduction
There is now a body of research on the adverse outcomes of supply chain
outsourcing for vulnerable workers labouring within supply chains.1 This
includes the impact of domestic supply chain outsourcing on vulnerable
workers in the textile clothing and footwear (TCF) industries who are
labouring in developed countries2 and exploitation of workers in developing
countries.3 Increasingly, a preferred response to exploitation of ‘supply chain
labour’ is legislative imposition of mandatory schemes regulating supply
* Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Technology, Sydney. This paper reports on research
undertaken for an Australian Research Council funded project, Australian Supply Chain
Regulation: Practical Operation and Regulatory Effectiveness, DP120103162. Thanks to
Terry Carney, Shaunnagh Dorsett and the anonymous referees for their comments. Any
errors are my own.
1 See, eg, C Wright and J Lund, ‘Supply Chain Rationalization: Retailer Dominance and
Labour Flexibility in the Australian Food and Grocery Industry’ (2003) 17 Work,
Employment and Society 137; P James et al, ‘Regulating Supply Chains to Improve Health
and Safety’ (2007) 36 ILJ 163; P James and D Walters, ‘What Motivates Employers to
Establish Preventative Arrangements? An Examination of the Case of Supply Chains’ (2011)
49 Safety Science 988.
2 See, eg, I Nossar, R Johnstone and M Quinlan, ‘Regulating Supply-Chains to Address the
Occupational Health and Safety Problems Associated with Precarious Employment: The
Case of Home-Based Clothing Workers in Australia’ (2012) 17 AJLL 137.
3 See, eg, G Gereffi et al, ‘Introduction: Globalisation, Value Chains and Development’ (2001)
32 Institute of Development Studies Bulletin 1; S Cooney, ‘A Broader Role for the
Commonwealth in Eradicating Foreign Sweatshops?’ (2004) 28 MULR 290; M Anner, J Bair
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chains, such as the industry-specific schemes in Australia.4 One key lesson is
the importance of changing the commercial dynamics of the supply chain by
imposing mandatory obligations on participants exercising the greatest
commercial influence over other participants — a category of entrepreneurial
entities variously described as ‘effective business controllers’5 or ‘lead firms’.6
This harnesses their influence to ensure that all other commercial parties in the
chain meet their legal obligations towards supply chain labour.
This article breaks from established literature (which examines systems of
supply chain regulation generally) by focusing solely on mandatory legal
obligations (applying to a category of effective business controllers) at the top
of the chain. This regulation exists in Australia under a world-leading form of
‘top down’ regulation contained within mandatory clothing retailer codes
made under state legislation. This article is the first to analyse the codes in
detail and identify their significant implications. The article argues that the
imposition of mandatory obligations at the apex of domestic TCF supply
chains can instil discipline throughout the chain to achieve improvements in
the pay, conditions and work health and safety of vulnerable TCF outworkers
at the base of those particular supply chains. It therefore concludes that
imposing obligations on business controllers of supply chains is a crucial
component of any scheme to improve the working conditions of supply chain
labour, and on that basis suggests adapting and extending this regulatory
model beyond the domestic TCF sector. In particular, it contends that the TCF
industry legislative model could be adapted to apply to domestic supply chains
in other industries. Moreover, the pre-existing cross-jurisdictional state
regulation of domestic supply chains (which currently spans different
Australian state jurisdictions) indicates that domestic legislation could be used
to cross-jurisdictionally regulate the international supply chains of effective
business controllers (operating within that domestic jurisdiction) to improve
the conditions of workers engaged by their overseas suppliers.
The article proceeds as follows. First, it explains the research methodology
of partly completed empirical research drawn upon in this article. Next, it
explains the widespread emergence of supply chains. It then considers the
necessity for regulating the effective business controllers of supply chains by
examining their influence over whole supply chains. This includes both a
generic analysis of the influence of effective business controllers within both
domestic and international supply chains in any industry, as well as a more
specific analysis of effective business controllers in the domestic TCF
industry. Second, the article traces the development of, and analyses, legal
obligations applying to clothing retailers under mandatory retailer codes in
three Australian jurisdictions (New South Wales, South Australia and
and J Blasi, ‘Toward Joint Liability in Global Supply Chains: Addressing the Root Causes
of Labor Violations in International Subcontracting Networks’ (2013) 35 Comp Lab L &
Pol’y J 1.
4 Nossar, Johnstone and Quinlan, above n 2; James et al, above n 1; R Johnstone et al, Beyond
Employment: The Legal Regulation of Work Relationships, Federation Press, Sydney, 2012,
pp 68–9; M Rawling and S Kaine, ‘Regulating Supply Chains to Provide a Safe Rate for
Road Transport Workers’ (2012) 25 AJLL 237.
5 Nossar, Johnstone and Quinlan, above n 2.
6 Gereffi et al, above n 3.
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Queensland).7 This section considers the extent to which these mandatory
retailer obligations are triggered by the (frequently cross-jurisdictional) deal
between a retailer and its supplier so that they may achieve consequences for
all TCF supply chain workers including consequences outside the
geographical boundaries of the regulating state. Compared to the NSW and
SA mandatory codes (which, upon a preliminary assessment, may have been
implemented as intended), the initially proclaimed form of the Queensland
code is shown to have had the broadest potential application but that this was
weakened by amendment, poor implementation (and its ultimate repeal). The
final section considers the significance and broader implications of these
developments for the regulation of domestic and international supply chains
within and beyond the TCF sector.
Research project and methodology
This article is part of an Australian Research Council funded project8
investigating the operation in practice of industry-specific legislative schemes
regulating the TCF supply chains in three jurisdictions (New South Wales,
Queensland and South Australia) and the road transport supply chains in two
(New South Wales and Queensland) along with the impact on supply chains
of Work Health and Safety (WHS) legislation in those states. Although the
study will ultimately compare and contrast the implementation of legislation
in the TCF industry to the implementation of legislation in the road transport
industry, this article concentrates on industry-specific legislative initiatives in
the TCF industry.
The larger study utlilises a range of research methods including
interviewing key informants and workplace observations.9 The project will
involve at least 50 qualitative interviews overall including 20 with
governmental regulators, 20 with union regulators and at least 10 with
businesses (or business representatives) and workers. At the time of writing,
30 interviews and five workplace inspections had been completed.10
Twenty-six of the interviews completed were with governmental and union
regulators from both the TCF and road transport industries. Four of the
interviews completed were with businesses involved in TCF and road
7 Ethical Clothing Trades Extended Responsibility Scheme 2004 (NSW) (NSW Mandatory
Retailer Code); Fair Work (Clothing Outworker Code of Practice) Regulations 2007 (SA)
Sch 1 – South Australian Clothing Outworker Code of Practice (SA Mandatory Retailer
Code); Mandatory Code of Practice for Outworkers in the Clothing Industry (Qld) (Qld
Mandatory Retailer Code). Those mandatory retailer obligations remain in place in New
South Wales and South Australia, but were abolished in Queensland in November 2012. See
further analysis below in this article.
8 Australian Supply Chain Regulation: Practical Operation and Effectiveness, DP120103162.
9 In addition to legal and documentary analysis, the project fieldwork includes semi-structured
interviews principally to capture the experience of regulators (namely, government officials
and relevant union officials) but also regulated businesses. Participant observation of
regulators is also being undertaken by accompanying them to workplace inspections. Finally
quantitative analysis will be undertaken of measurable statistical data or records about
working conditions within the industries.
10 Additionally, around seven follow-up interviews were conducted with particularly
informative interviewees (from the initial 30) in order to gain a deeper understanding of their
experience.
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transport supply chains or employer associations who represent such
businesses. Interview protocols were utilised (and refined in light of
experience) to provide some common structure, but semi-structured
interviews were deliberately chosen so interviewers could be guided by the
conversation rather than a rigid set of questions. Issues raised by one
interviewee were able to be discussed with later interviewees.
While the empirical research is incomplete, this article draws on five
interviews completed in the TCF industry, and reports some preliminary
indications about the implementation of the TCF model of regulation, to be
fully tested and refined once the field work and data analysis is finished.
The widespread emergence of supply chains
Australian labour law, at least from the mid-twentieth century, predominately
assumed that labour law’s scope was regulation of the direct relationship
between employees and a single entity known as the employer.11 However, the
assumed standard employment arrangement has declined. This has involved
the demise of the unifying category of ‘employee’12 and the emergence of a
spectrum of worker types (including a range of ‘precarious workers’).13 In
addition, following widespread outsourcing of work, the unitary employer has
been replaced14 with more complex business network structures (involving a
number of interconnected organisations) such as the vertical supply chain.
This type of supply chain is an interconnected series of contracts organised to
produce and sell goods and/or services at a profit for the effective business
controllers of the chain. Supply chains reach from the commercial party who
sells goods or services to consumers through a number of interposed
commercial parties, right down to the workers who perform the work.
The role of the effective business controller in the
supply chain
A study of the role of effective business controllers who wield the most
commercial influence in supply chains clearly demonstrates the need to
regulate them in order for schemes of supply chain regulation to improve
working conditions of workers at the base of the chain.
Powers of effective business controllers generally
Just as the commercial power of the large, unitary employer (common in the
twentieth century) enabled all relevant aspects of the business to be shaped or
governed — crucially including all aspects of labour relations — so too the
contemporary effective business controller of a supply chain retains the same
11 Johnstone et al, above n 4, at p 1.
12 J Howe and R Mitchell, ‘The Evolution of the Contract of Employment in Australia:
A Discussion’ (1999) 12 AJLL 113.
13 See M Quinlan, C Mayhew and P Bohle, ‘The Global Expansion of Precarious Employment,
Work Disorganisation and Occupational Health: Placing the Debate in a Comparative
Historical Context’ (2001) 31 International Journal of Health Services 507.
14 See J Fudge, ‘Fragmenting Work and Fragmenting Organizations: The Contract of
Employment and the Scope of Labour Regulation’ (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall LJ 609.
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potential,15 even if it is sometimes wrongly asserted that their activities do not
shape the labour relations of other commercial parties in the supply chain, or
that they are too small to do so.
Effective business controllers can coordinate multiple-level, vertical,
international and domestic supply chains made up of direct suppliers,
contractors to those suppliers, distributors and other businesses who can
indirectly and cost-effectively provide them with labour. The goods or services
produced by that indirect labour and supplied up through the chain of
businesses can then be sold to consumers more profitably than if they were
produced by an integrated firm.16
Direct access to consumer markets and/or control over intangibles such as
brands and product design allow effective business controllers to outsource
production to suppliers, severing any direct relationship with supply chain
workers, but, at the same time, maintaining the key role in specifying who
produces what and how it is produced.17 Typically, the effective business
controller sets, in contracts with its direct suppliers, the size and frequency of
orders, delivery schedules, time allowed for production and price and quality
of goods or services. These parameters (which are passed down the chain to
all further participants) practically determine matters such as supply chain
workers’ pay and work time.18 In some circumstances, effective business
controllers may also directly monitor or intervene into the work practices of
their indirect labour force.19 The effective business controller is frequently not
even physically located within the same geographical jurisdiction as the
supply chain workers whose working conditions they influence.20 As part of
the power inherent of a client who can provide (or cease to provide) another
commercial party with work, effective business controllers can get suppliers to
15 See H Collins, Regulating Contracts, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, p 24;
A Rainnie, ‘The Reorganisation of Large Firm Subcontracting: Myth and Reality’ (1993) 49
Capital and Class 53 at 68.
16 M Rawling and J Howe, ‘The Regulation of Supply Chains: An Australian Contribution to
Cross-National Legal Learning’ in Rethinking Workplace Regulation: Beyond the Standard
Contract of Employment, K V W Stone and H Arthurs (Eds), Russell Sage Foundation, New
York, 2013, p 233 at p 235.
17 J Bair, ‘Global Capitalism and Commodity Chains: Looking Back, Going Forward’ (2005)
9 Competition and Change 153 at 165; Gereffi et al, above n 3, at 1.
18 C Wright and W Brown, ‘The Effectiveness of Socially Sustainable Sourcing Mechanisms:
Assessing the Prospects of a New Form of Joint Regulation’ (2013) 44 Industrial Relations
Journal 20 at 22; D Grimshaw, H Willmott and J Rubery, ‘Inter-Organizational Networks:
Trust, Power, and the Employment Relationship’ in Fragmenting Work: Blurring
Organizational Boundaries and Disordering Hierarchies, M Marchington et al (Eds),
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p 39 at p 40; I Nossar, ‘The Scope for Appropriate
Cross-Jurisdictional Regulation of International Contract Networks (Such as Supply
Chains): Recent Developments in Australia and Their Supra-National Implications’,
Business Outsourcing and Restructuring Regulatory Research Network Working Paper
No 1, 2007, p 9, at <http://www.borrrn.org/index.php?option=com_content&view
=article&id=3:first-working-paper&catid=1:working-paper-series&Itemid=8> (accessed 3
November 2014).
19 J Rubery, J Earnshaw and M Marchington, ‘Blurring the Boundaries to the Employment
Relationship: From Single to Multi-Employer Relationships’ in Fragmenting Work: Blurring
Organizational Boundaries and Disordering Hierarchies, M Marchington et al (Eds),
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p 63 at p 76.
20 Nossar, above n 18, p 9.
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accept their terms as well as manipulate competition among potential
suppliers to achieve the right price and quality for goods or services.21 This
influence comes from the strategic position as clients at or near the apex of the
supply chain, allowing smaller, astute controllers (as well as those with
significant market share) to decide who participates in a particular supply
chain and on what terms they participate.22 Despite the controls maintained by
the business controller, it is other parties to the supply chain who bear the risks
of the supply process.23 There is now substantial evidence that dictation of
aspects of production and services delivery (notably time and costing) by
effective business controllers has significantly contributed to poor work and
health and safety outcomes for workers engaged within their supply chains.24
Despite their extensive influence, a key commercial tactic of many effective
business controllers is to deny they have any control beyond their dealings
with direct suppliers.25 Certainly part of the initial attraction of the supply
chain structure is the creation of legal distance between effective business
controllers and workers down the chain. But this has been an increasingly
risky strategy given the reputational damage that might result from a failure
of business controllers to enforce adequate labour conditions throughout their
supply chains. There is also increasing expectations of investors to safeguard
the business’s reputation by satisfactorily addressing labour conditions within
their supply chains.26 The discussion below in this article demonstrates that
the mandatory clothing retailer codes have effectively addressed this kind of
tactic.
Clothing retailers operate as effective business controllers
In the Australian TCF industry an oligopoly of major retailers are effective
business controllers of TCF supply chains.27 In contracts for the supply of
TCF goods these retailers impose on manufacturers or suppliers onerous
contractual terms to secure the price and quality of goods and the turnaround
times that the retailers require.28 Principal manufacturers in Australia who
enter into supply contracts with retailers either manufacture TCF products in
their own factories or enter into arrangements with smaller manufacturers
21 I Nossar, ‘Cross-Jurisdictional Regulation of Commercial Contracts for Work beyond the
Traditional Relationship’ in Labour Law and Labour Market Regulation: Essays in the
Construction, Constitution and Regulation of Labour Markets and Work Relationships,
C Arup et al (Eds), Federation Press, Sydney, 2006, p 202 at p 209; Grimshaw, Willmott and
Rubery, above n 18, p 57; James et al, above n 1, at 166.
22 Rawling and Howe, above n 16, p 241.
23 Nossar, above n 18, p 10.
24 M Quinlan, Supply Chains and Networks Report, Safe Work Australia, July 2011, p 4.
25 See Wright and Brown, above n 18, at 26; Australian Council of Superannuation Investors,
Labour and Human Rights Risks in Supply Chain Sourcing: Investment Risks in
S&P/ASX200 Consumer Discretionary and Consumer Staple Companies Research Paper,
Australian Council of Superannuation Investors, June 2013, p 11.
26 Australian Council of Superannuation Investors, above n 25, p 3; Walter and James, above
n 1, at 992.
27 M Islam and A Jain, ‘Workplace Human Rights Reporting: A Study of Australian Garment
and Retail Companies’ (2013) 23 Australian Accounting Review 102 at 103.
28 I Nossar, ‘Behind the Label’: The New South Wales Government Outworker Strategy — The
Importance of the Strategy and Prerequisites for Its Success, Briefing Paper, TCFUA,
Sydney, 2000, p 3.
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(popularly known as ‘makers’) for the supply of these products. When this
occurs, principal manufacturers pass on the stringent requirements of the
retailers to the makers so that they can meet their own obligations to retailers.
These smaller Australian makers will engage onsite manufacturing workers
but will also often further contract out the clothing orders through varying
stages of intervening entrepreneurial parties until the actual production work
is finally given out to ‘outworkers’. These outworkers typically work at
home29 and make up approximately 40% of the workers in the TCF industry.30
In the journey down the supply chain each successive party takes it share
of financial return but passes on the contractual demands originally
determined by the retailer. By the time the orders reach the smaller operators
who directly engage workers, those direct work providers (who frequently
have insufficient resources to carry out their labour law obligations) have an
incentive to evade any legal obligations owed to their workers so as to survive
in an environment where competitors undercut each other by offering the
lowest price for manufacturing work.31 Therefore, the structuring of the
supply chain primarily by effective business controllers (as well as principal
manufacturers) creates an environment that is conducive to outworker
exploitation.32 Prior to the introduction of mandatory retailer obligations,
major retailers were content to preside over supply chains which provided
them with quickly produced, high quality clothing and large profit margins,
but which also led to the exploitation of outworkers (who were sufficiently
distant from the retailers to ensure that retailers could escape legal liability for
this exploitation).33 As a result of cost, quality and time pressures from major
retailers and fashion houses which are passed down the entire chain, many
clothing outworkers experience pay as low as the equivalent of between $2
and $5 an hour,34 long hours, a high incidence of work-related injuries and
high levels of threats and abuse from work providers.35 Because outwork is
frequently carried out at residential premises in the largely ‘invisible’
economy, it is difficult for regulators to locate workplaces to enforce industrial
laws.
Implications of the effective business controller’s role for
public regulation
The above analysis of effective business controllers demonstrates that they
already regulate supply chains for their own commercial interests. This also
29 Nossar, Johnstone and Quinlan, above n 2, at 145.
30 E Diviney and S Lillywhite, Ethical Threads: Corporate Social Responsibility in the
Australian Garment Industry, Brotherhood of St Laurence, Melbourne, 2007, p 5.
31 C Mayhew and M Quinlan, ‘The Effects of Outsourcing on Occupational Health and Safety:
A Comparative Study of Factory-Based Workers and Outworkers in the Australian Clothing
Industry’ (1999) 29 International Journal of Health Services 83 at 88.
32 M Rawling, ‘A Generic Model of Regulating Supply Chain Outsourcing’ in Labour Law and
Labour Market Regulation; Essays on the Construction, Constitution and Regulation of
Labour Markets and Work Relationships, C Arup et al (Eds), Federation Press, Sydney,
2006, p 520 at p 525.
33 I Nossar, Proposals for the Protection of Outworkers from Exploitation, TCFUA, Sydney,
June 1999, p 2.
34 Mayhew and Quinlan, above n 31, at 98; Diviney and Lillywhite, above n 30, p 4.
35 Mayhew and Quinlan, above n 31, at 98; Quinlan, above n 24, p 7.
Cross-jurisdictional implications of clothing retailer obligations 197
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 14 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Fri Dec 5 08:58:34 2014
/journals/journal/ajll/vol27pt3/part_3
suggests that they might regulate supply chains to enhance rather than
undermine the pay, conditions and safety of supply chain labour. This
foreshadows opportunities for public regulation to harness the existing powers
of the business controller. Such public regulation could, for example, require
effective business controllers to set down work standards for supply chain
labour and to monitor and enforce compliance with these requirements
throughout their supply chains.36 Despite these opportunities for public
regulation, prior to the introduction of mandatory clothing retailer codes, few
(if any) existing legislative provisions in Australia imposed any mandatory
obligations regarding working conditions at the base of supply chains upon
retailers.
The evolution of mandatory clothing retailer
obligations
This section examines the evolution of effective business controller
obligations under mandatory clothing retailer codes which came into force in
New South Wales in 2005, in South Australia in 2008 and in Queensland in
2011 (until its repeal in Queensland in November 2012). Although these are
industry-specific codes applying to clothing retailers, their design could be
adapted to apply to effective business controllers in other industries.
Moreover, although these codes regulate domestic supply chains, their
cross-jurisdictional application spanning different Australian states indicates
that the regulation’s conceptual basis could inform cross-jurisdictional
regulation of supply chains spanning national borders.
The mandatory retailer codes are part of a package of federal and state
mandatory rules that regulate supply chains to protect vulnerable TCF workers
in Australia. Under state legislation there are also deeming provisions and
rights of recovery for outworkers.37 At the federal level the Fair Work
Act 2009 (Cth) contains Pt 6-4A — special provisions about TCF outworkers
which also provide deeming provisions, an outworker right of recovery and
provisions for the making of a mandatory code (at some future time). In
addition, special provisions regulating outwork exist within the federal Textile
Clothing, Footwear and Associated Industries Award 2010.38 These other parts
of the package contain important provisions which allow regulators to protect
vulnerable TCF outworkers. However, the mandatory retailer codes are a
crucial component of the scheme because, as is discussed further below, these
codes interlock with the Homeworkers Code of Practice to specifically
regulate powerful retailers at the top of the chain.
36 Nossar, above n 18, p 9; Walter and James, above n 1, at 989.
37 See S Marshall, ‘An Exploration of Control in the Context of Vertical Disintegration’ in
Labour Law and Labour Market Regulation; Essays on the Construction, Constitution and
Regulation of Labour Markets and Work Relationships, C Arup et al (Eds), Federation Press,
Sydney, 2006, p 542 at pp 553–4; Rawling, above n 32, pp 528–36.
38 For the history of TCF industry awards, see S Marshall, ‘Australian Textile Clothing and
Footwear Supply Chain Regulation’ in Human Rights at Work: Perspectives on Law and
Regulation, C Fenwick and T Novitz (Eds), Hart, Oxford, 2010, p 555 at pp 566–9.
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New South Wales
Mandatory clothing retailer obligations originated in New South Wales. The
process by which these mandatory obligations were achieved in New South
Wales involved complex interactions between the development of voluntary
and mandatory retailer obligations and lengthy negotiations and consultations
between government, unions and, at times, disunited, subsets of capital. The
genesis of this mandatory retailer regulation was a sustained campaign to
address outworker exploitation led by the Textile Clothing and Footwear
Union of Australia (TCFUA) along with community organisations including
Fair Wear and Asian Women at Work. This was a ground-breaking campaign
in New South Wales given that, at that point in time, no other mandatory
clothing retailer code existed in anywhere in Australia.
The NSW inquiry into pay equity released in 1998 found that there was
‘widespread and endemic failure’ to comply with pre-existing award clothing
outwork provisions.39 Justice Glynn stated that:
it is important that all retailers, fashion houses, governments and government
agencies become party to appropriate codes of practice/conduct . . . If all relevant
participants do not sign then consideration should be given to making the code
mandatory.40
In June 1999 Igor Nossar, the then Chief Advocate of the TCFUA (NSW) also
identified the importance of regulating retailers in order to effectively address
outworker exploitation:
garments in NSW will often not be made under NSW state award conditions unless
the parties at the apex of the contracting pyramid — the major retailers — are
subjected to a NSW state legislative regime which compels those commercially
powerful parties to utilise that very commercial power in favour of the protection of
outworkers (rather than against that purpose of protection) . . . the commercial
behaviour of those retailers — especially their behaviour in relation to the giving out
of work — must be rendered transparent and visible to all authorised policing
agencies.41
Due to the link between commercial pressures emanating from the top of the
supply chain and adverse work outcomes for supply chain labour, the
accountability of retailers was a prerequisite to effective enforcement of
outworker protections. To this end, in 1996, the TCFUA had negotiated a
‘Deed of Cooperation’ with at least one major retailer, which obliged the
retailer to inform the TCFUA about the number, type and price of products
supplied to the retailer, obliged the retailer to compel all of its suppliers to
keep records about further giving out of work to further parties down the
chain, and impelled the retailer to inform the TCFUA if the retailer became
aware of any instances of outworker exploitation by any party at any level in
that retailer’s supply chain.42
Also, in 1997, the Homeworkers Code of Practice, a self-regulatory
39 Industrial Relations Commission of NSW, Pay Equity Inquiry Report to the Minister, Matter
No IRC6320 of 1997, 14 December 1998, p 641 (Glynn J).
40 Ibid, p 643.
41 Nossar, above n 33.
42 Ibid, p 3.
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industry scheme, was negotiated between the TCFUA and major employer
bodies representing TCF manufacturers and retailers.43 Part 2 of that code
provided for the accreditation and regulation of TCF manufacturers. The
(original) Pt 1 of the Homeworkers Code of Practice committed TCF retailer
signatories to obtain TCF products from manufacturers accredited under Pt 2
of the code. But it failed to set more rigorous retailer obligations which might
have addressed outworker exploitation such as an obligation which would
require retailers to find out where their work orders were going and under
what conditions their work was performed. In any case, voluntary,
self-regulatory schemes tend to commercially disadvantage more ethical
retailers because they had agreed not to profit from outworker exploitation,
while less ethical retailers not covered by the voluntary scheme continue to
profit from such exploitation.44
In June 1999, legislative outworker protections in New South Wales were
proposed by Nossar.45 In December 1999 the NSW government released an
issues paper on the NSW government’s outwork strategy.46 While the NSW
Labor government was in power (from 1995 to 2005), the Industrial Relations
(Ethical Clothing Trades) Act 2001 (NSW) (the Ethical Clothing Act (NSW))
was enacted.47 Part 2 of that Act established a tripartite industry council
known as the Ethical Clothing Trades Council of New South Wales48 which
had the ability to recommend the making of a mandatory clothing retailer code
for New South Wales. Such a council consisting of a chairperson and
representatives from the Australian Retailers Association, Australian Business
Ltd, the Australian Industry Group (NSW), Unions NSW and the TCFUA
(NSW) was formed after the Ethical Clothing Act (NSW) commenced in
February 2002. This council had a fixed timetable to consult and report to the
relevant Minister, who (upon considering the council’s report) could then
proclaim mandatory clothing retailer obligations.49 Before the expiry of the
timetable for this tripartite process, the dynamic created by the impending
possibility of mandatory retailer obligations allowed the TCFUA to negotiate
first a new self-regulatory code for NSW retailers,50 and then a new Pt 1 to the
Homeworkers Code of Practice.51 Following this the TCFUA finalised
individual code agreements with three major clothing retailers binding them to
identical terms to the National Retailers/TCFUA Ethical Clothing Code of
43 See Homeworkers Code Committee Inc, Application for Revocation of A91252-55 and
Substitution of Authorisations A91354-57 in respect of Homeworkers Code of Practice,
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 21 February 2013, p 1.
44 Nossar, above n 28, pp 2, 4–5, 12; see also Marshall, above n 38, p 572.
45 Nossar, above n 33.
46 NSW Department of Industrial Relations, Behind the Label — The NSW Government
Clothing Outwork Strategy Issues Paper, NSW Department of Industrial Relations,
December 1999.
47 This Act contained stand-alone provisions as well as amendments to the Industrial Relations
Act 1996 (NSW). Previous literature has examined the crucial ‘bottom up’ rights of
outworkers contained with this NSW legislative scheme: Nossar, Johnstone and Quinlan,
above n 2; Marshall, above n 37; Rawling, above n 32.
48 Industrial Relations (Ethical Clothing Trades) Act 2001 (NSW) s 5 (NSW Ethical Clothing
Trades Act).
49 NSW Ethical Clothing Trades Act ss 11, 12.
50 NSW Retailers/TCFUA Ethical Clothing Code of Practice, 18 September 2002.
51 National Retailers/TCFUA Ethical Clothing Code of Practice, 9 October 2002.
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Practice.52 However, at this point, many less ethical retailers did not become
signatories to this self-regulatory scheme.
The first version of the Ethical Clothing Council’s recommendation drafted
by Nossar recommended the making of a mandatory clothing retailer code for
New South Wales.53 This draft was reflected in the NSW Ethical Clothing
Trades Council’s first recommendation in its 2003 report.54 The council’s
recommendation to make a mandatory code was supported by five out of the
total six stakeholder organisations sitting on the council including the
Australian Retailers Association (representing retailers) and the Australian
Industry Group (representing a portion of clothing manufacturer employers).55
The relevant NSW Ministers then adopted the council’s recommendation. By
order in Gazette on the 15 December 2004, mandatory retailer obligations
were proclaimed in the form of a delegated legislative instrument entitled the
Ethical Clothing Trades Extended Responsibility Scheme (the NSW
mandatory code). This mandatory retailer code took effect on 1 July 200556
and is still currently in operation at the time this article was written.
Coverage of NSW mandatory code
The NSW mandatory retailer code applies to all retailers, wherever domiciled,
who sell clothing products within New South Wales (NSW retailers) where
those products are manufactured or altered in Australia (except those retailers
who are signatories to and are operating in compliance with the National
Retailers/TCFUA Ethical Clothing Code of Practice (formerly known as Pt
One of the Homeworkers Code of Practice).57 It also applies to all suppliers,
wherever domiciled, including locations outside of New South Wales, who
enter into any agreement with a NSW retailer for the supply of such clothing
products; and those supplier’s contractors (including subcontractors to
contractors).58 Therefore, the only limits on the cross-jurisdictional
application of the code are that clothing is manufactured in Australia and sold
in New South Wales. Otherwise, it appears that retailers and suppliers can be
domiciled in any location. Many direct suppliers will also be manufacturers
such that the cross-jurisdictional application of the code would be confined
within Australian borders. However, the scope of the code is, in theory, broad
enough to apply to a supplier domiciled overseas who arranges for goods
manufactured in Australia for a NSW retailer. It is also sufficiently broad
enough to regulate a retailer domiciled overseas who sells Australian-made
clothes in New South Wales. Therefore the definition of retailer appears to
have foreshadowed the era of arms-length internet retailing. This aspect of the
code signals the development of a model for obligations upon effective
52 These individual agreements ensured that code terms would still apply to those major
retailers even if they ceased membership of the Australian Retailers Association.
53 I Nossar, Mandatory Code Recommendations — First Draft, 26 May 2003.
54 NSW Ethical Clothing Trades Council, Twelve Monthly Report, NSW Ethical Clothing
Trades Council, 2003, p 36.
55 Ibid; Nossar above n 18, p 15.
56 Order under the NSW Ethical Clothing Trades Act s 12, New South Wales Government
Gazette No 200, Official Notes, 17 December 2004.
57 NSW Mandatory Retailer Code, definitions of ‘retailer’ and ‘manufacture’, cll 5, 8.
58 NSW Mandatory Retailer Code, definitions of ‘supplier’, ‘retailer’, ‘manufacture’ and
‘contractor’, cl 5.
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business controllers which could be adapted to regulate any kind of domestic
or international supply chain including those where goods are sold over the
internet.
The National Retailers/TCFUA Ethical Clothing Code of Practice imposes
disclosure obligations parallel to the mandatory code obligations upon each
affected retailer. This ensures that no domestic retailer of (domestically
worked on) clothing products can escape from the obligation to proactively
provide the governmental and union regulators59 with the necessary
information required to track down all locations where clothing work is
performed within Australia, as long as the finished product is sold by clothing
retailers which are subject to a state mandatory code or the National
Retailers/TCFUA Ethical Clothing Code of Practice.
Obligations under NSW mandatory code
Both retailers and suppliers are subject to two main types of obligations under
the NSW mandatory code. First, the commercial parties in the TCF supply
chain are required to contract in a particular way due to requirements to
include certain contractual terms. Second, there are more traditional statutory
obligations which require regulated parties to record and disclose relevant
information.
Under the NSW code, when retailers enter into an agreement with a supplier
(for the supply of domestically-produced Australian clothing), these retailers
are required to obtain a range of outcomes from their suppliers which extend
to mandatory contractual terms (in the form of an undertaking). In those
circumstances, the retailer must obtain an undertaking from the supplier that
(a) all addresses where work is performed on the clothing products (whether
at a factory or at the residential address of an outworker) will be disclosed to
the retailer; and (b) the engagement of outworkers by the supplier (or its
contractors) will be under conditions no less favourable than the prescribed
industrial award conditions.60 The retailer must also inform the supplier that
a breach of the supplier’s undertaking (by the supplier, or the contractor, or
both) will be taken to be a breach of the agreement and grounds for
termination of the agreement (between the retailer and the supplier).61
Therefore the undertaking becomes an essential term of the agreement
between the retailer and the supplier. A NSW retailer must not enter into an
agreement with a supplier in those circumstances if the retailer has not
obtained the undertaking from that supplier.62
This first type of obligation whereby the state intervenes into the
contracting practices of commercial parties has ample precedent. Modern
welfarist principles have modified freedom of contract63 such that, under
general contract law and consumer law, parties are being required to include
59 The term ‘regulators’ is used in this article to describe both parties charged with
responsibilities for enforcing retailer obligations — governmental inspectorates and unions.
See further T Hardy and J Howe, ‘Partners in Enforcement? The New Balance between
Government and Trade Union Enforcement of Employment Standards in Australia’ (2009)
22 AJLL 306.
60 NSW Mandatory Retailer Code cl 10(2), Sch 2 Pt B.
61 Ibid.
62 NSW Mandatory Retailer Code cl 10(3).
63 See Collins, above n 15.
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or exclude particular contractual terms. For example, under consumer
protection laws, the state requires the parties to read particular terms into
contracts with consumers.64 In addition, the contract law doctrine of illegality
prohibits parties from including certain terms in a contract.65 This form of
regulation has the inherent capacity to apply cross-jurisdictionally because the
regulation attaches to the contract or agreement between parties which has
always been able to span jurisdictional boundaries. In any case, under the
mandatory codes, the agreement between the retailer and its supplier forms the
principal basis for most of the regulatory intervention including traditional and
contracting obligations. As is argued more fully below, the extent to which the
mandatory code obligations are solely triggered by the existence of a deal
between a retailer and its supplier is significant, given that this deal (if not
accompanied by other jurisdictional restrictions) could form the basis of
domestic state regulation of international supply chains.
Retailers also have information-gathering and record-keeping obligations
under the NSW mandatory code. Under the NSW code, if a retailer enters into
an agreement with a supplier (for the supply of domestically-produced
Australian clothing), that retailer must request from the supplier (and the
supplier must thereupon provide to that retailer) all addresses where work is
performed, whether outworkers are used, the name and address of each
outworker (and of each employer of the outworkers), the name and address of
each contractor engaged by the supplier, and the number and type of clothing
products made under the agreement (between the retailer and that supplier).66
Where the retailer enters into such an agreement with a supplier, the retailer
must also keep records of all locations where work is performed.67 The only
requirement for these obligations to apply is the retailer/supplier agreement
(and not the engagement of a particular type of worker).
Furthermore, these obligations mean retailers have a ‘need to know’
important information about outworkers performing work within their own
supply chains. It is no longer possible for clothing retailers to comply with
their legal obligations under the mandatory code and deny any knowledge of
what happens beyond their direct contract with suppliers. The ‘need to know’
obligation operates so that the clothing retailer cannot pretend to not know
information about who is performing their clothing manufacture work. This
‘need to know’ obligation is analogous to the well-known commercial concept
of ‘due diligence.’ Like due diligence, the ‘need to know’ obligation allows
the retailer to gain important information about other commercial entities they
deal with, allowing them to make decisions about future dealings with those
other entities. In many cases, the retailer would have already acquired the
required information by way of pre-existing commercial activities. For
example, in one contract imposed by a retailer on a manufacturer, the retailer
was allowed to inspect (and even substantially control) the manufacturing of
64 See discussion of consumer guarantees regime in A Bruce, Consumer Protection Law in
Australia, 2nd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2014, Sydney, Ch 10.
65 See discussion in J W Carter, Contract Law in Australia, 6th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths,
Sydney, 2013, pp 624–34.
66 NSW Mandatory Retailer Code cl 10(1)(b), Sch 2 Pt B cl 15.
67 NSW Mandatory Retailer Code cl 12(1)(f).
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clothing.68 And it appears that clothing retailers are acting upon such
contractual rights. Recent factory inspections of some makers undertaken as
part of fieldwork by the author and research colleagues revealed that the
quality control representative of the retailer and principal manufacturer was
present at or had recently visited maker sites when inspections occurred.69
In addition, a NSW retailer has important disclosure obligations. A NSW
retailer must proactively (and regularly) disclose to the governmental and
union regulators (at least every 6 months) records of all suppliers’ names and
addresses (and whether outworkers are engaged).70 Hence, regulators have a
‘right to know’ corresponding to the retailers ‘need to know’. The retailer
obligations to obtain information and to keep and disclose records arise when
a retailer enters into an agreement with a supplier but are not tied to the
engagement of an outworker.71 Therefore, the retailer must keep records of all
clothing supply chains and provide details of all locations where work is
performed for a contractor or subcontractor, whether the work is performed by
a factory worker or an outworker or by any kind of worker who performs
clothing manufacturing work.
Further, if a NSW retailer enters into an agreement with a supplier (for the
supply of domestically-produced Australian clothing), a retailer must ascertain
(from the supplier) whether an outworker is to be engaged (to perform work
under the agreement between the retailer and that supplier).72 Where a NSW
retailer becomes aware that an outworker was (or would be) engaged (by a
supplier, contractor, transferee, or supplier’s continuing entity) on less
favourable terms or conditions than those prescribed under a relevant award
(or relevant industrial instrument), then the retailer must report the matter to
the relevant union or government officer.73 If a NSW retailer enters into an
agreement with a supplier (for the supply of domestically-produced Australian
clothing), the retailer must provide (to the supplier) a specified standard form
(itemising all relevant information about that agreement) to be completed (and
returned to the retailer) by the supplier — and the retailer must then retain that
completed standard form (and provide an extract of that standard form to the
relevant regulators).74 Finally, under the currently applicable codes, a retailer
must not enter into an agreement with a supplier (for the supply of
domestically-produced Australian clothing) or accept clothing products (from
a supplier or contractor) unless the supplier (and each contractor used by the
supplier) is registered to give out work under the relevant industrial
instrument.75
Intervention into commercial contracting practices under the NSW
mandatory code’s provisions also imposes requirements on suppliers who
provide clothing goods to retailers. Specifically, a supplier must include with
the invoice to the retailer (for the supply of domestically-produced clothing
68 Nossar, above n 28, p 3.
69 See also Diviney and Lillywhite, above n 30, p 5.
70 NSW Mandatory Retailer Code cl 12(3), Sch 1.
71 NSW Mandatory Retailer Code cl 12, definition of ‘agreement’ cl 5.
72 NSW Mandatory Retailer Code cl 10(1)(a).
73 NSW Mandatory Retailer Code cl 11(1), definition of ‘relevant person’ cl 5.
74 NSW Mandatory Retailer Code cl 13(1), Sch 2 Pt A, cl 15, cl 12.
75 NSW Mandatory Retailer Code cl 21.
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products) a completed copy of the undertaking from the supplier to the
retailer. Additionally, with such an invoice, suppliers are required to disclose
information to retailers about all locations where work is performed on that
clothing.76 This obligation to provide work locations is not dependent on the
type of worker performing the work (although it includes the situation where
an outworker is engaged). Under the NSW mandatory code, a supplier must
also provide the retailer with sufficient information to enable the retailer to
keep (and disclose) accurate records. A supplier must further provide the
retailer with sufficient information to enable the retailer to take reasonable
steps to ascertain compliance with the NSW mandatory code throughout the
retailer’s supply chain.77 In particular, a supplier must, ‘when showing
samples of clothing or offering for sale ready-made items of clothing to a
retailer, indicate to the retailer whether any or all of the clothing items will be,
or have been manufactured in Australia’.78 A supplier must keep records about
all locations of where work is to be performed, details of the originating
agreement between the retailer and the supplier, and details about each of the
supplier’s contractors.79
The NSW mandatory code also imposes obligations upon each supplier in
regard to that supplier’s dealings with its own contractors. In particular, at the
time of engaging a contractor, the supplier must provide that contractor with
full details of the originating agreement between the retailer and the supplier
(including the undertaking from the supplier to the retailer and all locations
where work is to be performed).80 Finally, a contractor to a supplier (which
includes a subcontractor to a supplier’s contractor)81 has obligations under the
NSW mandatory code. Such a contractor must provide the contractor’s own
subcontractor with details about the contract between the retailer and supplier,
including the undertaking from the supplier to the retailer.82 A supplier’s
contractor must also keep records of the originating agreement (between the
supplier and the retailer), including the undertaking from the supplier to the
retailer.83 These obligations ensure that parties below the supplier in the TCF
supply chain have explicitly been made aware that the retailer has required its
principal supplier (and the supplier has undertaken to the retailer) that the
principal supplier and all of its contractors in the supply chain will engage
outworkers under conditions no less favourable than those under the relevant
award or industrial instrument. Under the NSW mandatory code, a retailer,
supplier, contractor or subcontractor covered by the code who fails without
reasonable excuse to adopt any code standard or practice is guilty of an
offence.84
The mandatory code capitalises on retailers’ commercial influence in the
clothing supply chain to ensure the transparency of the contracting process in
76 NSW Mandatory Retailer Code cl 15 (3), Sch 2 Pt B.
77 NSW Mandatory Retailer Code cl 14.
78 NSW Mandatory Retailer Code cl 15(1).
79 NSW Mandatory Retailer Code cl 16(1)(b), Sch 2.
80 NSW Mandatory Retailer Code cl 16(1)(a), Sch 2.
81 NSW Mandatory Retailer Code, definition of ‘contractor’ cl 4.
82 NSW Mandatory Retailer Code cl 16(2)(a).
83 NSW Mandatory Retailer Code cl 16(2)(b).
84 NSW Mandatory Retailer Code cll 7(2), 10(3); NSW Ethical Clothing Trades Act s 13.
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the supply chain and to efficiently capture crucial information about where
production work is taking place and who is undertaking that work. Some
preliminary evidence suggests that the system of ‘top down’ obligations
imposed on NSW retailers is taking effect. In at least one instance unearthed
in the course of fieldwork interviews, a NSW retailer, with the assistance of
a regulator, reportedly used knowledge gained by the imposition of retailer
obligations to compel other commercial entities to comply with industrial
obligations owed to workers within their supply chain.85 In another instance
raised during fieldwork, a major retailer, working with a regulator, found that
a particular supplier was not in compliance with industrial obligations owed
to workers within their chain. The retailer reportedly cancelled clothing supply
orders from that supplier for a number of weeks, until the retailer was
contacted by the regulator to say that the supplier was working with the
regulator to address those non-compliance issues. The retailer apparently
wanted to send a message to the rest of their suppliers that, if a supplier was
not compliant with industrial obligations owed to relevant workers, the retailer
was prepared to suspend their clothing orders.86 These practical examples
appear to substantiate previous comments made by James et al that regulating
a few large commercial parties with the greatest commercial influence in the
chain can achieve a ‘multiplier’ effect of compliance throughout many smaller
commercial operations in the chain.87 These examples demonstrate that, as a
result of mandatory retailer obligations, certain retailers have been encouraged
to act ethically and police supply chains.
Moreover, it appears that regulators have initiated the cross-jurisdictional
regulation of supply chains spanning the borders of various Australian states.
In a further instance revealed during the course of interviews, regulators have
reportedly followed a cross-jurisdictional supply chain involving a retailer
with retail stores in a number of states, a large factory in one state and smaller
makers located in a number of other states.88 Indeed NSW regulators have
used information disclosed by businesses at or near the top of the supply chain
to track down many sites of clothing production performed for retailers
throughout Australia, making the hidden workforce visible.89 In one
reasonably large clothing supply chain, the original number of workers
(identified by traditional means by a NSW regulator visiting workplaces) grew
to four times the original amount of workers (as a result of top down tracking
mechanisms by that NSW regulator). In another large supply chain the number
of workers known to regulators increased by seven times the original number
of identified workers. And finally in a third, smaller, supply chain the number
of identified workers grew by approximately three times the number originally
identified.90 This type of data presented by Nossar in 201191 was also
85 Regulator Interview A.
86 Regulator Interview B.
87 James et al, above n 1, at 176.
88 Regulator Interview C.
89 Nossar, above n 18, p 16.
90 I Nossar, ‘Supply Chain Regulation in the US and Australia: A Comparative Perspective of
the Effectiveness of Regulating OHS’, presentation delivered at International Symposium on
Regulating OHS for Precarious Workers, Deakin University, Melbourne, 17 June 2011.
91 Ibid.
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discussed by an interviewee who stated, ‘that’s the sort of information the
[mandatory] code delivers’.92 This indicates the importance of harnessing
retailer power in order to successfully implement regulation and produce
increased workforce visibility. Moreover, in each of these three cases of
dramatically increased visibility, regulators were able to secure compliance
for most or all of these workforces with pay and conditions standards, work
health and safety standards as well as workers compensation legal
requirements.93
However, these preliminary findings need to be fully tested and confirmed
after collecting and analysing all of the project data. Furthermore, it appears
that some retailers are attempting to get around the domestic system by
sourcing a tiny amount of ethically-produced clothes from Australian
producers so that they can say they are operating ethically, but then sourcing
the rest of their clothing from overseas.94 This reinforces the need for
domestic regulation of international supply chains which is discussed further
below.
Regulators play a critical role in implementing the NSW mandatory code.
Although there have been few if any prosecutions of the NSW mandatory
code, it appears that the threat of prosecution is frequently deployed by
regulators,95 and retailers act to avoid prosecution and negative media
exposure.
The mandatory code has been used by regulators specifically in relation to
retailers. But the NSW mandatory code is also used in conjunction with the
whole TCF industry legislative scheme including the federal modern award to
successfully regulate the entire TCF supply chain.
South Australia
In South Australia, outworker provisions were inserted into the (renamed) Fair
Work Act 1994 (SA) by the Industrial Relations (Fair Work) Act 2005 (SA).96
One of those inserted provisions allows the SA government to make a
mandatory clothing retailer code ‘by regulation’.97 The making of a code by
executive regulation drastically simplified the process compared to the parallel
method required in New South Wales described above (involving the
formation of a tripartite industry council). The relevant SA governmental
agency then conducted consultations with key stakeholders98 including those
with the TCFUA (NSW/SA/Tas branch). In 2006, during the term of the Rann
Labor government, the SA government released for public consultation a draft
92 Regulator Interview B.
93 Nossar, above n 90.
94 Business interview A.
95 Regulator interview A.
96 The amending legislation renamed the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994 (SA) as
the Fair Work Act 1994 (SA) (SA Fair Work Act). Previous literature has examined the
resulting, ‘bottom up’ rights of SA outworkers: see Marshall, above n 37; Rawling, above n
32. For a proposal for legislative protections for outworkers in South Australia, see I Nossar,
Proposals for Protection of Outworkers in South Australia, TCFUA, Sydney, 2002.
97 SA Fair Work Act s 99C.
98 Safe Work Australia, ‘Clothing Outworker Code’, explanation available at SafeWork SA,
Clothing Outworker, at <http://www.safework.sa.gov.au/show_page.jsp?id=5052>
(accessed 3 November 2014).
Cross-jurisdictional implications of clothing retailer obligations 207
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 24 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Fri Dec 5 08:58:34 2014
/journals/journal/ajll/vol27pt3/part_3
mandatory clothing retailer code.99 In 2007, regulations called the Fair Work
(Clothing Outworker Code of Practice) Regulations 2007 (SA) were made.
Those regulations, which contain the South Australian Clothing Outworker
Code of Practice (SA mandatory code) in Sch 1, commenced on 1 March
2008100 and are still currently in operation at the time this article was written.
The SA mandatory retailer code has a parallel scope of application to the
NSW mandatory retailer code. It applies to all retailers (wherever domiciled)
who sell clothing products within South Australia (SA retailers) as long as
those clothing products are manufactured (or altered) in Australia (except for
those retailers who are signatories to — and are operating in compliance with
the National Retailers/TCFUA Ethical Clothing Code of Practice).101 It also
applies to each supplier, wherever domiciled, who enters into any agreement
with a SA retailer for the supply of such clothing products (including ‘a
supplier who carries on business outside’ South Australia); and also applies to
those supplier’s contractors (including subcontractors to contractors).102
Those retailers, suppliers, contractors and subcontractors are then subject to
almost identical (if not identical) obligations under the SA mandatory code to
those which exist under the original NSW mandatory retailer code.103
Queensland
During the term of the previous Queensland Labor government, additional
outworker protections were inserted into the Industrial Relations Act 1999
(Qld) by the Industrial Relations and Other Acts Amendment Act 2005
(Qld).104 These amendments included the insertion of a provision which
allowed the Queensland government to make a mandatory clothing retailer
code by giving notice of such a code which constitutes subordinate
legislation.105 Hence, this Queensland process of making a mandatory code
closely parallels the simplified SA method of executive regulation. A
mandatory retailer code called the ‘Mandatory Code of Practice for
Outworkers in the Clothing Industry’ (Qld mandatory code) was made and
commenced on 1 January 2011.106 At the time the code was made a Labor
government still retained office in Queensland. In March 2012, the Newman
coalition government was elected to the Queensland Parliament. In November
2012, after a concerted campaign by the Council of Textile and Fashion
99 Draft Outworker (Clothing Industry) Protection Code (SA).
100 Fair Work (Clothing Outworker Code of Practice) Regulations 2007 (SA) s 2.
101 SA Mandatory Retailer Code, definitions of ‘retailer’ and ‘manufacture’ cll 5, 8.
102 SA Mandatory Retailer Code definitions of ‘supplier’, ‘retailer’, ‘manufacture’ and
‘contractor’, cl 5.
103 The SA Mandatory Retailer Code has an additional cl 28 (which concerns the application of
SA award protections) and an additional cl 8(2). The maximum penalty for a breach of the
SA Mandatory Retailer Code differs from the maximum penalty for a breach of the NSW
Mandatory Retailer code: see SA Mandatory Retailer Code cl 7(2).
104 For a proposal for legislative outwork provisions for Queensland see I Nossar, Proposals for
the Protection of Outworkers in Queensland, TCFUA, Sydney, 2002.
105 Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) s 400I.
106 Qld Mandatory Retailer Code cl 2.
208 (2014) 27 Australian Journal of Labour Law
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 25 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Fri Dec 5 08:58:34 2014
/journals/journal/ajll/vol27pt3/part_3
Industries of Australia mainly representing small clothing manufacturers, the
Queensland mandatory code was repealed.107
Although there are certain generic features common to all three mandatory
retailer codes, obligations under the Queensland code were not identical to the
obligations under the other two codes. Despite its repeal, the initially
proclaimed form of the Queensland mandatory code is of continued interest,
given that it contained a number of regulatory innovations beyond the
previous extent of retailer obligations under mandatory codes in New South
Wales and South Australia. Specifically, the Queensland code contained a
broader set of obligations which intervened into the contracting practices of
the parties compared to the NSW and SA codes.
The Queensland mandatory code had a similar scope of application to the
NSW and SA mandatory codes. It applied to all retailers who sold clothing
products in Queensland, suppliers, wherever domiciled, who supplied to those
retailers, supplier’s contractors and subcontractors to those contractors.108
Under the initially proclaimed form of the former Queensland code, when a
retailer entered into an agreement with a supplier (for the supply of
domestically-produced Australian clothing) the retailer previously had to
obtain an undertaking from the supplier that (a) all addresses where work is
performed on the clothing products (whether at a factory or residential
address) will be disclosed to the retailer; and (b) the engagement of
outworkers by the supplier (or its contractors) would be under conditions no
less favourable than the prescribed industrial award conditions.109 Under that
former Queensland code, like the other state mandatory codes, the retailer also
had to inform the supplier that a breach of the supplier’s undertaking (by the
supplier, or the contractor, or both) would be taken to be a breach of the
agreement and grounds for termination of the agreement (between the retailer
and the supplier).110
In an innovation beyond the operation of the NSW and SA codes, under that
Queensland code suppliers previously had to obtain an undertaking and work
locations from their contractors.111 A supplier also had to inform the contractor
that a breach of the undertaking allowed the supplier to terminate the
agreement with the contractor.112 Therefore, under the former Queensland
code, the intervention into contracting practices applied to contracts between
suppliers and their contractors (as well as the contract between retailers and
their suppliers). In addition, contractors to suppliers had similar obligations to
suppliers. That is, previously in Queensland, a contractor would have had to
provide an undertaking and work locations to the supplier.113 In this way,
under the former Queensland code, there was an unbroken chain of
107 Repeal Notice [Subordinate Legislation 2012 No 193 made under the Industrial Relations
Act 1999 (Qld)] as of 9 November 2012.
108 Qld Mandatory Retailer Code, definitions of ‘retailer’, ‘supplier’, ‘manufacture’ and
‘contractor’ cl 4.
109 Qld Mandatory Retailer Code cl 10(1).
110 Qld Mandatory Retailer Code cl 10(1)(b), (c), Form 3A; NSW Mandatory Retailer Code cl
10(2), Sch 2 Pt B; SA Mandatory Retailer Code cl 10(2), Sch 2 Pt B.
111 Qld Mandatory Retailer Code cl 15(c), Form 4A.
112 Qld Mandatory Retailer Code cl 15(d), Form 4A.
113 Qld Mandatory Retailer Code cl 15(c), Form 4A.
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intervention into contracting practices throughout the supply chain.
The former Queensland code contained similar retailer obligations to the
other state codes to keep records of work locations and proactively and
regularly disclose supplier and work location records to government and union
regulators.114 The Queensland code also contained similar obligations to have
ascertained whether an outworker was to be engaged;115 to have reported
when an outworker was engaged under less favourable than award conditions;
to have provided to the supplier and then collect from the supplier and report
to regulators a form itemising agreement information;116 and to not have
entered into an agreement with a supplier unless the supplier and its
contractors had registered to give out work.117
Under the former Queensland mandatory code, suppliers faced similar
obligations to the NSW and SA code obligations to provide the retailer with
sufficient information for that retailer to maintain records and ascertain
compliance.118 Furthermore, under that mandatory code, a supplier’s invoice
to the retailer (for the supply of domestically-produced clothing products to
that retailer) had to be accompanied by the supplier’s provision of full details
of any contracts between that supplier and the supplier’s contractors.119
According to fieldwork interviews, a regulator visited workplaces to give
out copies of the Queensland mandatory code to TCF businesses in an effort
to educate regulated parties about their obligations under the code.120
However, after these workplace visits, many regulated parties were reportedly
confused about who had what obligations and, as a result, in certain instances,
outworkers were reportedly incorrectly led to believe that they had to comply
with (non-existent) code obligations to receive work. Unlike regulator activity
in at least one other state, it appears from the fieldwork data gathered so far,
that there may have been less effort by regulators to work with TCF businesses
so that those businesses could work towards full compliance over a period of
time.121 This unsuccessful attempt to explain the Queensland mandatory code
may have fuelled business opposition to the code, which became a crucial
factor which led to the code’s abolition. Nevertheless, some features of the
design of the initially proclaimed form of the Queensland mandatory code
remain the best template for adaptation to other contexts.
Implications of regulating the effective business
controller
Preliminary findings about the successful implementation of currently
applicable mandatory clothing retailer codes indicate that governments can
regulate the contracting practices of effective business controllers.
114 Queensland Mandatory Retailer Code cll 16(2)(a), 14, Form 3, Form 1.
115 Qld Mandatory Retailer Code cl 10(1)(a).
116 Qld Mandatory Retailer Code cl 11(1), Form 2, cl 12.
117 Qld Mandatory Retailer Code cl 12.
118 Qld Mandatory Retailer Code cl 16(1), cl 16(2), Form 3, Form 3A.
119 Qld Mandatory Retailer Code cl 16(2)(b).
120 Regulator interview C.
121 Regulator Interview D. See also ‘Shock at Steps to Repeal Queensland Code Protecting
Outworkers’, Fairwear Latest News, 30 November 2012, at <http://fair
wear.org.au/resources/latest-news/> (accessed 3 November 2014).
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Governments can dictate to commercial parties with the greatest influence in
the chain how to contract in order to successfully regulate supply chain
outsourcing for employment policy purposes. It is appropriate for
governments to so dictate contracting practices to business controllers where
those business controllers set the parameters of work performed within their
chain. It is especially important for governments to intervene into contracting
practices of effective business controllers where commercial pressures coming
from those business controllers lead to low pay, poor working conditions and
poor work health and safety outcomes. By regulating entire supply chains,
including the activities of commercial parties with the most commercial
influence in the chain, the root causes of poor outcomes for supply chain
labour can be addressed. Moreover, by harnessing the power of business
controllers, mandatory regulation can operate to empower those business
controllers to police their supply chains for ethical as well as commercial
reasons; if mandatory regulation can encourage business controllers to
become the most ethical or responsible parties in the supply chain, the role of
addressing supply chain labour issues might be partially assumed by the
business controllers themselves. Therefore the imperatives of regulators and
business controllers can be aligned to compel the rest of the parties in the
supply chain to comply with their legal obligations towards supply chain
labour.
Domestic implications
The lessons of prior experiences in implementing mandatory retailer codes
need to be heeded, especially the crucial importance of having a regulator with
sufficient incentive and resources to work with business controllers over time
to achieve business compliance. Although this point is important it would be
broadly applicable to implementing a variety of legislation in the commercial
sphere and beyond. Provided that sufficient attention is given to implementing
the regulation, and, in light of preliminary indications that business controllers
may be successfully regulated under the currently applicable mandatory
codes, it is appropriate to consider extending mandatory regulation of TCF
retailers to other jurisdictions around Australia. One possible avenue for such
an extension of the scope of mandatory retailer obligations is under federal
legislation. Indeed, under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), a TCF industry
mandatory retailer122 code can be made by executive regulation.123 Such a
federal code may make provisions for retailer obligations by applying,
adopting or incorporating any matter contained in one of the mandatory codes
made under state law.124 Currently a federal mandatory code has not been
made. Such a federal code is unlikely to be made during the term of the
current Abbott coalition government. In this context, the currently applicable
state mandatory codes demonstrate that there is a continuing role for state
jurisdictions to regulate TCF business controllers even in the era of transfer of
industrial relations powers to the Commonwealth. If Labor regains
government in an Australian state, a campaign for extending the scope of
122 See especially Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) s 789DC(5).
123 FW Act ss 789DA–789DD.
124 FW Act ss 789DE(3), (4).
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mandatory clothing retailer obligations under that state jurisdiction might
simply use the implementation of the NSW and SA mandatory codes (and the
initially proclaimed form of the Queensland code prior to amendment) as a
regulatory model for TCF retailers.
The regulation of TCF retailers under mandatory codes also has
cross-industry application. That is, the regulation of TCF retailers might be
used as an illustrative, currently-existing model of regulation which could be
adapted and applied to other industries such as the road transport,
construction,125 cleaning126 and aged care industries,127 within which effective
business controllers also affect the work parameters of supply chain labour.
Indeed, in somewhat uncertain political circumstances128 the road safety
remuneration tribunal considered the application of mandatory obligations to
another subset of business controllers — consignors and consignees of road
freight. The existing state mandatory clothing retailer codes were raised in the
tribunal proceedings as existing examples of laws already regulating a
category of effective business controllers.129
Implications for regulating international supply chains
The current geographical scope of the mandatory clothing retailer codes also
has potentially far-reaching implications for the regulation of transnational or
international supply chains which are used by effective business controllers to
source goods or services from overseas jurisdictions and sell those goods or
services in a home, developed-world jurisdiction. The NSW, SA (and formerly
Queensland) mandatory retailer codes applied (or formerly applied) legislative
obligations to any ‘supplier who carries on business outside’ the respective
state as long as the supplier was supplying TCF products to a retailer regulated
(by the respective mandatory code).130 The mandatory codes currently require
(or required) retailers to gather and keep records about contracts for the supply
of clothing products manufactured anywhere in Australia.131 Therefore, these
codes already have or had consequences beyond the geographical borders of
the relevant state jurisdiction. There seems no obvious legal impediment
125 See H Collins, ‘Ascriptions of Legal Responsibility to Groups in Complex Patterns of
Economic Integration’ (1990) 53 MLR 731 at 732.
126 See United Voice, ‘Clean Start: Fair Deal for Cleaners — Subcontracting and Illegal
Practices Fact Sheet’, United Voice, 17 October 2009, at <http://
www.unitedvoice.org.au/tender/fact-sheets/subcontracting-and-illegal-practices> (accessed
3 November 2014).
127 See S Kaine, ‘Collective Regulation of Wages and Conditions in Aged Care — Beyond
Labour Law’ (2012) 54 JIR 100.
128 Eric Abetz, the federal Minister for Employment, announced a review of the operation of the
Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal: E Abetz, ‘Review of the Road Safety Remuneration
System’, Media Release, 30 November 2013. At the time of writing a review of the road
safety remuneration tribunal was being conducted, see Commonwealth Department of
Education, ‘Review of Road Safety Remuneration System’, at <https://
employment.gov.au/review-road-safety-remuneration-system> (accessed 3 November
2014).
129 Transcript of Proceedings, Re Transport Workers’ Union of Australia, Road Safety
Remuneration Tribunal (RTO2013/1), 29 October 2013.
130 NSW Mandatory Retailer Code cl 19, definition of ‘supplier’, ‘retailer’ and ‘manufacture’
cl 5.
131 NSW Mandatory Retailer Code, definition of ‘clothing products’ cl 5.
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preventing domestic jurisdictions from exercising these same regulatory
powers to span national borders and achieve outcomes abroad.132
The form of international supply chain regulation being proposed here
would not rely on an extra-territorial application of state powers.133 Rather, it
would involve the exercise of intra-territorial legislative jurisdiction. From the
beginnings of commercial activities, commercial parties have conducted
business deals which stretch across national boundaries. This is how
international supply chains are formed. Commercial parties within one
jurisdiction contract with commercial parties in another, overseas jurisdiction.
It is these commercial contracting practices which enable intra-territorial
regulation of international supply chains.134 Specifically, the exercise of
intra-territorial powers to extend regulation beyond national borders rests
upon the business dealings between a regulated retailer (with sufficient
geographical nexus to the relevant state in order to invoke the exercise of
intra-territorial legislative jurisdiction) and a supplier having commercial
dealings with such a regulated retailer. That is, the intra-territorial basis for
this form of regulating international supply chains arises from the fact that the
regulated retailer who contracts with an outside supplier must conduct retail
business within the geographical borders of the relevant home-state
jurisdiction. Therefore intra-territorial legislative jurisdiction could be used to
regulate the actual contracts or arrangements between such a regulated retailer
and its suppliers located around the globe. In particular, like the mandatory
codes, this legislative jurisdiction could be used to dictate additional terms of
(prime) supply contracts between a regulated retailer and its overseas
suppliers and harness the influence of the regulated retailer conducting
within-jurisdiction commercial activities to achieve outcomes throughout an
international supply chain even where most of that relevant commercial
behaviour and all of the work actually performed (ultimately for the retailer)
physically occurs outside the geographical borders of the regulating state.135
For example, in the TCF sector, an Australian clothing retailer might have
obligations to obtain information from suppliers about all overseas locations
of production and the conditions under which clothing products are produced
at those locations. The retailer could then be obliged to report this information
to regulators and use commercial sanctions against a supplier where working
conditions are unsatisfactory. Governments at all levels possess this
intra-jurisdictional power to regulate international supply contracts of
business entities which in any way operate within or through the respective
geographical jurisdictions of those governments.136
It has been suggested that domestic regulation of international supply
132 Nossar, above n 18; R Johnstone, ‘Informal Sectors and New Industries: The Complexities
of Regulating Occupational Health and Safety in Developing Countries’ in Challenging the
Legal Boundaries of Work Regulation, J Fudge, S McCrystal and K Sankaran (Eds), Hart,
Oxford, 2012, p 67 at p 80.
133 For a proposal to use extra-territorial powers to regulate supply chains to achieve outcomes
abroad see Cooney, above n 3.
134 M Rawling, ‘Supply Chain Regulation: Work and Regulation beyond the Employment
Relationship’, PhD Thesis, University of Sydney, 2010, p 322.
135 Nossar, above n 18.
136 Ibid; Johnstone, above n 132.
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chains should focus on the eradication of ‘egregious labour abuses’137 such as
forced labour and child labour. This would have considerable support amongst
non-government organisations. Yet it is unclear whether an ‘egregious labour
abuse’ scheme would secure the necessary support from business. In this
regard the recent experience the Ethical Clothing Australia organisation
changing the name of its clothing label from ‘No Sweatshop’ to ‘Ethical
Clothing Australia’ is instructive. The name change occurred because business
didn’t want to be associated with the negative term ‘sweatshops’. A system
simply requiring a retailer to report information on where the work is done and
under what conditions may be preferable to some businesses, as it would
allow reporting of any satisfactory working conditions as well as any
unsatisfactory conditions or egregious labour abuses.
However, if the past is anything to go by, the conditions for adapting and
extending supply chain regulation to protect further categories of workers
would require a concerted union and community campaign akin to the
previously successful campaigns led by the TCFUA, which preceded
legislative regulation of TCF supply chains under Labor governments. Given
the current political climate that is hostile to unions, a weakened union
movement and a less active public campaign, it remains uncertain as to when
the necessary conditions would arise.
Conclusion
This article has evaluated the mandatory clothing retailer codes made under
state legislation in Australia. The article, by reference to examples, argued that
retailer obligations have contributed to the improvement of pay, working
conditions and the work health and safety of hitherto invisible clothing
outworkers. Mandatory obligations on clothing retailers with the greatest
influence in the supply chain were pivotal to particular instances of successful
implementation of the NSW legislative scheme regulating supply chains in the
TCF sector. This indicates the entire supply chain needs to be regulated to
improve the working conditions of supply chain labour. However, these
findings are preliminary because the empirical research for the project
described in this article is incomplete. The field work and data analysis for this
project need to be finished to gain a fuller understanding of the
implementation and effectiveness of the legislative schemes in Australia
which regulate supply chains.
The article argued that the effective implementation of clothing retailer
obligations indicates that imposing obligations on effective business
controllers of domestic supply chains in other industries in Australia ought to
be considered as a measure to address the exploitation of supply chain labour
in those industries. Moreover, it was argued that the current
cross-jurisdictional application of the state mandatory codes beyond the
boundaries of the state within which those respective codes were made,
demonstrates there is an existing legislative capacity for intra-jurisdictional
regulation of international supply chains to protect workers abroad. Just as the
(sometimes cross-jurisdictional) deals between retailers operating in New
137 Cooney, above n 3, at 329.
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South Wales, South Australia and Queensland and their suppliers formed the
basis of regulatory intervention under the mandatory codes, so too the deal
between retailers (active in the domestic jurisdiction) and their overseas
suppliers could form the basis of domestic regulation of international supply
chains. Imposing obligations upon the effective business controller of the
supply chain is an essential element of the mandatory schemes required to
adequately address the exploitation of domestic and overseas supply chain
labour.
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